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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE SUPREME COURT
GOLDEN L. ALLEN,
State Treasurer,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CALVIN L. RAMPTON,
Governor of the State of Utah,
SHERMAN J. PREECE,
Auditor of Utah,
HERBERT F. SMART,
Director of Finance,
W. SMOOT BRIMHALL,
Commissioner Financial
Institutions, and the
BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
11804

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff, the State Treasurer of
Utah, a constitutional officer, against the defendants pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act (Rule 57, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Chapter 33, Title 78, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953) .
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In this proceeding, the plaintiff asks the court to declare the portions of the State Money Management Act
Chapter 206, Laws of Utah, 1969, (Senate Bill #205),
which affect the State Treasurer to be unconstitutional
and additionally requests that the defendants be enjoined
from implementing said sections of the act.

.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court in a Memorandum decision (Record
Page 73 Et. seq.) held that the State Money Management
Act, Chapter 206, Laws of Utah, 1969 (Senate Bill 205)
was constitutional and ordered that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice on the merits.
From this decision, the plaintiff has appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the
lower court and asks the Supreme Court to determine that
the State Money Management Act, Chapter 206, Laws of
Utah, 1969 (Senate Bill 205) is unconstitutional in whole
or in part, i.e., the portions thereof specifically and referred
tJ in the Complaint of the plaintiff (Record p. 1-6).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is the State Treasurer of Utah. He is a
constitutional officer created under the provisions of Article
VII, Section One of the Constitution of Utah and comprises a part of the executive department which consists of
the Governor, the Secretary of State, State Auditor, State
Treasurer and Attorney General.
The State Treasurer is an elective officer required to
perform "such duties as are prescribed by this constitution
and as may be prescribed by law."
2

Section Seventeen of Article VII of the Constitution
provides that "The Treasurer shall be the custodian of
public monies," and then additionally provides that he
shall "perform such other duties as may be provided by

Jaw."

Those additional duties are described to a large extent
in Chapter 4 of Title 67, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Under the provisions of various State statutes the
'
plaintiff, as State Treasurer, and his predecessor State
Treasurer's have made deposits of public funds in qualified
depositories designated by the State Depository Board
(Chapter 1 of Title 51, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). Pursuant to that act, the State Treasurer determines the
amount of deposits that may be made in any one depository and the amount of available cash necessary to take
care of immediate cash flow needs.
In pursuance of the provisions of Sections 33-1-4 and
33-1-4.1 relating to the investment of public funds, the
State Treasurer has determined what constitutes idle funds
or funds not necessary for the immediate needs of any of
the departments whose funds are in his hands and has
determined the types of obligations of the United States in
which investment would be made. The State Treasurer
again determined "the cash flow needs" of the State and
its respective departments in order to determine the maturities of the obligations of the United States which were purchased subject to the limitation that he not purchase any
item having a maturity of more than five years from date
of purchase. Similarly, under the provisions of Section
33-1-4.1, management of investments was in the hands of
the State Treasurer with respect to bonds of the United
States and of any municipalities, school district or water
conservancy district permitted to be handled under that
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section. Accordingly, the State Treasurer was required to
establish methods, practices and procedures for investment
reinvestment, purchase, sale or exchange transactions re-'
garding public funds and has been required to determine
the extent to which a portion of the public funds should
remain available for current expenditures.
Historically, the State Treasurer during the days that
Utah was a territory and thereafter has received all money
or property belonging to the territory or the State and
apparently dealt with that money in such manner as would
give assurance that it would be available for the expeditures of the State (Territorial Laws of Utah, 1851-70).
At Chapter 38, page 35, Laws of 1852, Sections 3 and 4
of the Territorial Laws provided as follows:
SECTION 3.
"The treasurer shall receive all monies or other
property belonging to the territory that may be
raised by taxation or otherwise; and shall procure
suitable books in which it shall enter an account of
his receipts and disbursements, to whom and on
what account."
SECTION 4.
"The treasurer shall pay all money that may come
into his hands, by virtue of his office, upon drafts
and orders countersigned by the auditor of public
accounts; and shall annually report to the governor
on or before the first day of November, or oftenor .... "

The compiled Laws of Utah, 1876, Title IV, Sections 46
and 47 contain substantially the same language as above
quoted with reference to Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 38,
Laws of Utah, 1852.
In the compiled Laws of Utah, 1876, provision was
made in Title 12, Section 2068, which established a list of
4

crimes by officers of that State including the State Treasurer which involved revenue and property of the State.
Subparagraph 3 of Section 2068 made it a crime if "he fails
to keep same in his possession until disbursed. or paid out
by authority of law." Subparagraph 4 provided that it was
a crime if he "unlawfully deposits the same or any portion
thereof in any book or with any banker or other person."
The compiled. Laws of Utah, 1888, contained. similar
provisions as those referred to above at Section 4603.
The Money Management Act, among other things,
creates a division of investments in the Office of the State
Treasurer. (Section 4, Chapter 206, Laws of Utah, 1969.)
It creates an Investment Council within the division of investments and provides that the Investment Council shall
be comprised of the State Treasurer, the Commissioner of
Financial Institutions and three other members appointed.
by the Governor with the advice and consent of the State
Treasurer and the Senate. (Section 5, Chapter 206, Laws
of Utah, 1969)
The Act impowers the Investment Council to establish
the p:::>licies of the division of investments, to advise counsel
and direct the Investment officer and the financial analyst to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations pertaining to the investment of public funds and in general to perform a series of other functions relating to the administration of public funds and the qualification and control of
depositories.
The Act at Section 9, provides, among other things,
for the employment of a "Chief Administrative Officer of
the Division of Investments and a Deputy Administrative
Officer of the Division to be known as the Financial Analyst."
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The Investment Officer and the Financial Analyst
"shall be appointed by the State Treasurer with the ap.
proval of at least four members of the Investment Council
and their respective salaries shall be fixed by the Council'
in consultation with the Director of Finance and approved
by the Board of Examiners."
Moreover, Section 9 provides that the Investment Officer and the Financial Analyst shall serve at the will of
the Investment Council.
Section 11 of the Act describes the duties of the Investment Officer which generally stated relate to the investment and reinvestment of public funds.
ARGUMENT
Point 1
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY OF THE STATE TREASURER AS "CUSTODIAN OF PUBLIC MONEY" INCLUDES THE POWERS OF DEPOSIT AND INVESTMENT DESCRIBED IN SECTIONS 7 AND 11 OF THE
MONEY MANAGEMENT ACT.
As a custodian of public monies it has been held that
the State Treasurer, in the absence of express authority,
has power to deposit public funds in the banks in accordance
with ordinary business practice and may stipulate for and
receive interest thereon. (59 C.J. p. 228, "States," Par. 374)
See also C.J.S. 1191 Par. 155.
See also U. S. Fidelity Company, etc. v. Taylor
Guarantee, 200 F, 44., State v. McFetridge, 54 N.W.
1 (84 Wis. 473).
In practice, the State Treasurer has in fact made deposits of funds into banks of his choosing subject to deter6

mination as to qualification of depositories by the State
Depository Board (See Statutory Citation in Statement of
Facts) and subject to determinations as to the required
interest rate that must be paid by qualified depositories
established by the State Depository Board.
In practice, too, the State Legislature has recognized
the duty of the treasurer so to do but has provided limitations and controls over the qualifications of the depositories, the amount of interest they may pay and has imposed
limits as to the amount that may be placed in the custody
of any one depository. (Section 51-4-1, Et. seq., Utah Code
Annotated, 1953), but determinations as to the amount of
the deposits placed in any one bank has been recognized in
practice as the duty of the State Treasurer.
The practice followed over many years may determine
the scope of the constitutional functions of the State Treasurer or of any other constitutional officer. This was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Tite v. State Tax
Commission, 57 P. 2d 734 p. 738.
So too both practice and state law has recognized the
duty of the investment of public money within the custody
of the State Treasurer in securities of the Federal Government. (Section 33-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).
In practice this investment in Federal bonds has been
followed by State Treasurers subject to approval as to
type of investment and amount of interest by the Board of
Loan Commissioners.
The decision as to whether or not any of the public
money within his custody should be invested in securities
was made by the State Treasurer and incidental to the
exercise of that duty the State Treasurer determined the
maturity dates at which he would make purchases of bonds
7

after making a determination as to daily balances of cash
needed by the various departments whose funds were in his
control.
Accordingly, he made determinations as to whether
or not they should be short term or long term investments
as contemplated by the provisions of Section 3 of the State
Money Management Act.
The State Treasurer accordingly asserts that the power
to make other types of investments than those heretofore
allowed by statute, and the duty to make said investments
is a part of the constitutional functions of the State Treasurer.
Generally speaking, the Treasurer of a state has those
consitutional duties concerning the holding of funds of the
state which are usually involved in the duties of a treasurer
(Tucker, Secretary of State, et al., v.State (Indiana) 35
N .E. Rep. 2nd, 270). To hold otherwise would place a treasurer in an untenable position. It is generally held that public
officers who have charge of public funds and public money
are charged with the duty as trustees to disperse and expend the money for the purposes and in the manner prescribed by law and they are liable if they divert the trust
funds from the governmental purposes for which they were
collected. ( 43 Am. Jur. p. 111, Par 306, Annot, 96 ALR, 664).
It is well established, also, that one duty of a public

officer entrusted with public money is to keep that money
safely and this duty he performs at his peril.
According to the weight of authority, numerically at least, a public officer in the absence of
statutory provisions to the contrary is held to a
much stricter liability than the fiduciaries handling private funds. He is absolutely liable as an in8

surer for the safekeeping of funds in his custody
until dispersed in regular course and is therefore
liable for losses which occur even without his fault.
(43 Am. Jur. 113 Par. 309) (Am. Jur. cites numerous cases in footnotes 5, 6 and 7, page 113 and annotations at 18 ALR 982; 38 ALR 1512, s 96 ALR
295; 93 ALR 821, 155 ALR 437)
Tooele County v. De La Mare, 90 Utah 46, 59
P2nd, 1155.
This strict accountability of public treasurers has even
been applied to the functions of a public treasurer in the
selection of depositories.
In most jurisdictions in the absence of statutes
to the contrary, the rule is firmly established that a
public officer entrusted with the custody of public
monies is personally liable for their loss through
the failure of the bank in which he has deposited
them, however careful and prudent he may have
been. It makes no difference that he believes the
bank to be sound or that it has generally been so
regarded and that in depositing the funds he merely followed a long prevailing custom. (ALR cites
numerous cases in footnotes 3, 4 and 5 and annotation at 65 ALR for 814).
Plaintiff affirms that the State Treasurer has by constitution the custody and control of the money of the State
and that said custody and control includes the function of
managing, investing, reinvesting and depositing the monies
of the State and that because his power is derived from the
constitution, he cannot be deprived of such control by the
legislature. In Re: House Resolution 12 Colorado 395, 21 P.
486. Tucker, Secretary of State, et al., v. State, 35 N.E.
Rep. 2nd, 270 (Indiana). Hudson v. Kelly (Ariz.) 263, P2nd,
362 Thompson v. Leg. Audit. Comm. (N.M.) 448 P2nd 799,
Wright v. Callahan (Idaho) 99 P2nd, 961.
9

Contrary to the conclusion reached by the District
Court in its Memorandum decision, the plaintiff does not
assert that the Legislature has no power to legislate directives to the State Treasurer with reference to the manner
of investment and the manner in which funds of the State
\\'ill be managed (Record p. 78). It is the assertion, however, of the State Treasurer that the State Legislature may
not in addition to exercising said controls, designate other
administrators to perform the functions of managing the
money and making the investments. The framers of the
Constitution of the State of Utah must be deemed to have
considered the term "custody of public monies" to encompass something more than a mere depository; otherwise,
why the creation of an elective office deliberately insulated
from powers and pressures that would arise were it an appointive office_
Custody by an elective constitutionally created officer who is hedged around with a firm obligation to protect
the public monies and expend them only in a manner directed by lawful means must encompass exclusive power or
obligation to dispose or handle funds such as make deposits,
determine the amount of a deposit, with whom the deposit
should be made and when the money should be withdravm
or mature. Custody must include the expenditure of the
money, either pursuant to directives of the Legislature or
to expend the money to purchase securities, i.e., bonds or
stock in order to utilize idle funds. Until the Money Purchase Act was enacted, the ability to invest was limited to
bonds of various kinds. But the fact remains that custody
was deemed to include a determination upon the part of the
State Treasurer as to which bonds would be purchased, the
maturities of the bonds purchased and the interest to be
derived therefrom. These powers had to do with the ability
to correlate the availability of money with the "cash flow
10

cbmrnds" of the various departments of government whose
funds were being managed. Throughout the years, this cus1ody of the State Treasurer was subjected to legislative
c:-uidelines. The legislature limited the State Treasurer as
to 1he types of bonds, imposed limitations as to maximum
1)1' minimum interest. maximum maturities, the types of
i.ssucr's, etc. Moreover, the Legislature during the past
years, imposed the qualifications of depositiories and created a depository board which made determinations as to the
q;:;tlifications of the depositories but who were required to
leave the decision as to when a deposit \vould be made and
with whom in the hands of the State Treasurer. (Title 51,
Chapters 4 and 5)
It is not conceivable that "the Treasurer" is limited to

the ministerial chores of a clerk, i.e., writing the voucher
or check, the bookkeeping and the making of reports. It

do:?s not seem conceivable that the State Treasurer would
be held accountable for the safety of the funds in his care
if he was a mere clerk and had no powers with reference
to the management of the funds.
If the Investment Committee and the Investment
Director carried out the management functions of the
money s:::'t forth in the Money Management Act, the State
Treasurer would not be able to make the determinations
rf'quisite to protecting the safety of the funds in his care

:-nd custody.
The plaintiff does not assert that the Legislature could
1-;ot accomplish the aims desired in the Money Management
•\ct to more economically utilize idle funds, but he asserts
that this must be done within the framework of his constitutional powers and obligations to retain custody and
control of the money involved.
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POINT 2
THE CREATION BY THE LEGISLATURE OF AN INVESTMENT DIVISION WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE
STATE TREASURER, THE CREATION OF THE INVESTMENT COUNCIL AND THE CREATION OF AN
INVESTMENT OFFICER AND FINANCIAL ANALYST
TO ADMINISTER THE FUNCTIONS OF SAID DIVISION
INDEPENDENTLY OR SEMI-INDEPENDENTLY OF
THE STATE TREASURER ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ENCROACHMENTS UPON THE POWERS AND DUTIES
OF THE STATE TREASURER AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
OFFICER.
The Constitution of the State of Utah follows the pattern of establishing three departments of government which
are comprised of the Legislative, Executive and the Judicial and expressly prohibits encroachment by one department upon the functions and powers of the other.
Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
"The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three district departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any function appertaining to
either of the others except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Article VII then describes the composition of the Exec·
utive Department in the following language:
"The
Governor,
Treasurer
hold his

Executive Department shall consist of
Secretary of State, State Auditor, State
and Attorney General, each of them shall
ice for four years beginning on the first

;ff
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Monday of January next after his election ... They
shall perform such duties as are prescribed by this
constitution and as may be prescribed by law.
At Section 10 of Article VII, the Governor is given
the powers of appointment of officers whose appointment
or election is not otherwise provided for in the following
language:
"The Governor shall nominate, and by and with
the consent of the Senate appoint all State and
District Officers whose offices are established by
this constitution, or which may be created by law,
and whose appointment or election is not otherwise
provided for ... "
At Section 17 of Article VII, the Ut,ah Constitution
describes the duties of the Treasurer jointly with a description of those of the Auditor in the following language:
"The Auditor shall be the auditor of public
accounts, and the Treasurer shall be the custodian
of public monies, and each shall perform such other
duties as may be provided by law."
It is the contention of the plaintiff, Treasurer, that the
above constitutional organizational structure does not im-

power the Legislature to directly make appointments of deputies and personnel within the Office of the State Treasurer nor does it grant to the Legislature the power to delegate powers to appoint personnel and deputies of the Office
of the State Treasurer to the Governor or to any other administrative officer who is a part of the Executive Department of the State of Utah. The power to appoint the subordinate officers and employees through whom the laws or
duties and functions are to be performed by a Constitutional
Officer is a necessary incident to the power to execute the
laws. If any other Executive Department were granted the
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power to make appointments of administrative personnel
and employees of the office of the State Treasurer it \Vould
for all practical purposes nulify the provisions of Article VII,
Section 1 of the State Constitution which creates the several
constitutional officers, including the State Treasurer, and
makes them elective officers selected by the public. The
power to appoint deputies and administrators in an administrative office such as that of the Treasurer is for all practical
purposes the power to administer the functions of that office.
One of the most recent leading cases which deals with
this problem of the separation of powers and of the effect
of the power of appointment is the case of Tucker, Secretary of State, et. al., v. State, (Indiana) 218 Ind. 614 35 N.E.
Rep. 2nd, 270. That case involved the reorganization of the
Executive branch of Government of the State of Indiana.
That reorganization involved five separate statutes which
provided for the termination of the tenure of various officers and boards, the placement of powers of appointment
in the Governor and the realigning of the various duties and
functions of the officers including some of their constitutional officers. The Supreme Court of Indiana, among other
questions, was required to deal with the problem of appoint
ment of officers by the Governor to the various administrative departments of government including the constitutional officers. That court had this to say:
"At the time our Constitution was adopted, it
was settled by the great weight of authority that
the provision granting the Executive po\ver and the
admonition to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed carried with them as a necessary and essential incident the power to appoint to office."
(Page 281)
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The Indiana Court in turn quoted from Chancellor
Kent. page 287 of Kent's Commentaries on American Law
cl;'; follows:
"The appointment of the subordinate officers
of government concerned in the administration of
law, belongs with great propriety to the President,
who is bound to see that the laws are faithfully executed and who is generally charged with the power's
and responsibility of the Executive Department. The
association of the Senate with the President in the
exercise of this power, is an exception to the general
delegation of Executive authority; and if he were
not expressly invested with the exclusive right of
nomination in the instances before us, the organization of this department would be very unskillful,
and the government degenerate into a system of
cabal favoritism and intrigue."
Incidental to commenting upon the power of appointment and the fact that it constitutes in reality power to
administer the office to which the appointments are made,
the
also took into consideration the power of removal
from office a power which is also delegated by the legislature to the Executive council in Section 9 of the Money
Management Act when the legislature provided "the investment officer and the financial analyst shall serve at
the will of the Investment Council."
Of this power, the Indiana court said at page
282, "Removal of Executive Officials from office is
an executive function; the power to remove, like
the power to appoint is part of the Executive power."
The Indiana Supreme Court also quoted from an earlier Indiana decision, Hovey v. Noble, 21 N.E., 248 118 Ind.
350. This was a case which involved an effort upon the part
of the legislature to provide for appointments into the Judi-
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cial branch of government. The Indiana court in that case
said,
"The truth is, that all independent departments
have some appointing power as an incident of the
principle power, for without it no department can be
independent."
"A department without power to select those
to whom it must entrust part of its essential duties
cannot be independent. If it must accept as 'ministers and assistants' as Lord Bacon calls them, persons selected for them by another department, then,
it is dependent upon the department which makes
the selections. To be independent the power of the
Judiciary must be exclusive, and exclusive it cannot
be if the legislature may deprive it of the right to
choose those with whom it shall share its labors or
its confidences. If one kingdom possesses the right
to send into another ministers and assistants, to
share with the governing power its functions and
duties, the latter kingdom is in no sense independent." (Page 247 of 21 N.E.)
The concept of division of powers and a nonencroachment upon the functions of one department by another applies equally to the impropriety of permitting one constitutional officer in the administrative or Executive branch of
government to encroach upon the functions and duties of
another constitutional officer also within the Executive or
administrative branch of government.
The legislature could not delegate to the Treasurer any
of the Executive powers enjoyed by the Governor. Conversely the Governor cannot be granted by the legislature
the custodial powers over public money granted to the
Treasurer. Again the Indiana court in Tucker v. State
dealt with this matter. It recognized that each branch of

16

government and each administrative office within any
branch had power to appoint the officers whose duties are
in incident to the function of the appointing office.
The court had this to say with relation to the various
powers of appointment exercisable by the respective departments and administrative units:
"It is equally well established by our decisions,
and decisions elsewhere, that the general assembly
may exercise the Executive power of appointment
of officers and employees whose duties are an incident to its legislative functions; and it cannot be
seriously doubted that administrative officers in the
administrative department of the government or in
the Judicial Department may exercise the Executive
power of appointing their own deputies and employees whose duties are incidental to the carrying
out of the administrative functions of the offices
they occupy. Thus, the clerk of the Supreme Court
may appoint deputies and assistants who are to assist him in his ministerial functions; and the Auditor,
Treasurer and Secretary of State exercise like power; and if the Governor had not been broadly vested
with the general executive power of the state but
had been vested only with special and limited executive authority, that would carry with it the incidental executive appointing power insofar as it
involved his subordinates and assistants . . . and
the appointive powers of administrative and ministerial officers in any department must be limited to
that which is incidental to their principle administrative or ministerial functions."

The plaintiff does not question the power of the legislature to create various kinds of offices and officers and to
provide for their appointment by the department of Government granted power either by the Constitution or statute
t'.) perform the functions thereof. It is the contention of
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the plaintiff, however, that the legislature does not have
power to create within the office of the State Treasurer a
department which may perform any of the constitutional
functions of the State Treasurer and it cannot create a
series of administrators within the office of the State Treas.
urer or council members who have power to perform the
functions of the State Treasurer. Otherwise, the provisions
of the State Constitution seeking to create an elective constitutional office could readily be defeated.
In the case at hand, the legislature by means of the
State Money Management Act seeks to create a council
and a director to manage the money of the State and to
invest and reinvest it.
In section 3 the definition of short term funds and long
terms funds implicitly required that the investment council
find what amount of money must be "expected to be required to be converted into cash within the next twelve
months or less."
Historically, the State Treasurer has performed this
function, the State Treasurer has determined what the
cash balance needs of the various departments whose funds
he handles. He has determined what amounts should be
deposited in readily available depository and what amounts
should be invested in United States Securities upon a longer
term basis. (Title 51, Chapter 405). That function would
now be performed by the Investment Council.
Constitutionally, plaintiff asserts he would be held accountable if the credit standing of the State were jeopardized
because of the inability upon the part of the various departments to pay claims and bills promptly when due.
Section 4 of the Act creates the division of investments
and provides that it shall be comprised of an Investment
Council and an Investment Director and Analyst.
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The Investment Council is comprised of four individuals
who are appointed by the Governor with the advice and
consent of the State Treasurer and the Senate. Three of
the Council constitute a quorum. Thus, it is entirely possible that the Council can direct the investment director to
perform money management functions which are contrary
to the judgment and decisions of the State Treasurer.
(Section 5, Money Management Act)
Likewise, plaintiff asserts that the creation of the office of Investment Officer and of Financial Analyst in
such manner that they are appointees of the State Treasurer but only with the approval of at least four members of
the Investment Council and subject to termination at the
will of the Investment Council, the legislature has effectively removed from the State Treasurer the power to
manage the affairs of the Office of the State Treasurer in
areas related to the investment, reinvestment and management of the public monies in his custody.
Accordingly, plaintiff asserts that the creation of these
offices and the method of their appointment are unconstitutional.
Asher v. Boatweight, 171 S.W.2nd, 27, Ky. 120.

POINT 3
THE MONEY MANAGEMENT ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DELEGATES TO THE INVESTMENT COUNCIL
AND TO THE INVESTMENT DIRECTOR AND INVESTMENT ANALYST THE CONSTITUTIONAL DlITIES AND
POWERS OF THE STATE TREASURER TO INVEST
AND MANAGE THE MONEY OF THE STATE.
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The Investment Council, under the provisions of Section 5 of the Money Management Act, is made up of four
members appointed by the Governor (including the Commissioner of Financial Institutions), and only one member,
i.e., the State Treasurer who is responsive directly to the
State Treasurer. At Section 7, the Investment Council is
given the functions of establishing the policies of the division of investments, of advising, counseling and directing the
investment officer and the financial analyst in the perform.
ance of their duties and powers and of adopting and promulgating rules and regulations pertaining to the kind or
nature of investment of public funds under the jurisdiction
of the division of investments and other duties expressly
set forth in Section 7.
The Investment Council can make these decisions without regard to the opinions or views of the State Treasurer.
This arises out of the fact that three of the council members shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of busness. It follows that the act of a majority will control and
thus the State Treasurer finds himself a dissenting minority
member.
In defiance of the provisions of the Constitution creating
the Office of State Treasurer, the Money Management Act
has substituted a multiple member council to perform the
functions of management of money which the framers of
our Constitution had seen fit to place in the hands of a
single person elected by the people.
As we have previously pointed out, the determination
of the cash balances that must remain available for use by
the various departments, i.e., the long term and short term
funds is now the decision of the Investment Council and the
previous practices followed by the State Treasurer will be
terminated by the Act.
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Moreover, the primary obligation of the State Treasurer has been to safeguard the funds of the State within
his custody.
Subparagraph 5 of Section 7, creates guidelines relating to the depositing of public funds which are concerned
with other factors such as "the need of local banks for loanable funds to support the economic growth in each area of
the state" and in subparagrph (b) "for at least a biennial
rotation of demand accounts of the State Treasurer among
qualified depositories."
A decision by majority vote of the Investment Council
could very well place the State Treasurer in a position of
noncompliance with his custodial duty to safeguard the
money of the State and may create an obligation under his
bond to protect against any loss that may occur.
Section 9 of the Money Management Act provides that
the chief administrative officer of the division of Investments shall be the Investment Officer and the deputy administrative officer of the division shall be the Financial
Analyst. Although the act provides that the appointment
be made by the State Treasurer, it requires him to secure
the approval "of at least four members of the Investment
Council." In effect, the State Treasurer has lost his constitutional ability to appoint a chief deputy in his office and
so too \vith respect to the administrative assistant known
as the Financial Analyst.
Moreover, the salaries are to be fixed by the Council
in consultation with the director of Finance and approval
by the State Board of Examiners. Again, effectively, the
State Treasurer has lost any real power to appoint these
important administrative officers within the office of the
State Treasurer.
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In addition, Section 9 provides that "in the discretion of
the Investment Council, both positions (Investment Officer
and Financial Analyst) may be filled by one person. The
Investment Officer and the Financial Analyst shall serve
at the will of the Investment Council."
In practical effect, these two administrative officers
have no relationship to the State Treasurer. If the Investment Council desires to establish a policy which the two
administrative officers find undesirable, their positions can
be terminated or consolidated so as to elminiate a disident
or to eliminate them both.
When we take into consideration the powers granted
them by Section 11 of the Act, we must further recognize
that for all practical purposes the State Treasurer has lost
all voice in connection with these important functions relating to the investment and management of public funds:
'' ( 1) To make purchases, sales, exchanges,
investments, and reinvestments in respect to public
funds subject to the jurisdiction of the division of
Investments pursuant to the policies, objectives, and
requirements of this Act.
(2) To see that public funds invested under
the jurisdiction of the division of Investments are at
all times handled to the best interest of the body
owning or having control of such funds, after giving
consideration to the needs of such body.
(3) To make such reports as Investment Council may require."
Similarly, Section 12 grants powers to the Financial
Analyst relating to the informational data important toward
money management and investment. The results of his
studies are reported to the Investment Officer and the Investment Council not to the State Treasurer. Moreover, he
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is subject only to the requirements of the Investment Council as to the making of additional reports. That section
reads as follows:
"The Financial Analyst shall have the following
powers and duties:
(1) To collect, organize and analyze cash flow
data regarding the financial systems of the State
and any other body owning or having control of
public funds subject to the jurisdiction of the division of Investments and to provide timely information of this to the Investment Officer and the Investment Council.
(2) To develop and submit to the Investment
Officer and the Investment Council programs for the
timing and applications of cash within the financial
systems of the State and any other body owning or
having control of public funds subject to the jurisdiction of the division of Investments and to develop improvements of same.
(3) To make such reports as the Investment
Council may require.
At Section 1 7, the Act provides that the Investment
Officer shall have the power to sell or otherwise dispose of
securities or investments in which public funds under the
jurisdiction of the division have been invested and have
thereby deprived the State Treasurer of performing any
act of judgment with reference to the management of the
money involved. The only function left to the State Treasurer, an elective constitutional officer, is purely that of a
ministerial depository.
Plaintiff submits that this is not the constitutional
intent and that he has been effectively deprived of his constitutional duties and powers by the provisions of the Act
complained of in his Complaint.
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The constitutionality of legislative efforts to eliminate
or materially reduce the functions of constitutional officers
was denied in three relatively recent cases by the Supreme
Courts of Idaho, New Mexico and Arizona. Each involved
efforts to elminate or reduce the functions of the State
Auditor or a constitutional officer in the following cases:
Wright v. Callahan (Idaho) 99, P2nd 961: 61
Idaho 167
Thompson v. Leg. Audit. Comm. (N.M.) 448
P2nd 799.
Hudson v. Kelly (Ariz.) 263, P2nd 362; 76
Ariz. 255.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully urges the court to declare as unconstitutional the Sections referred to in his Complaint and
that the defendants be permanently enjoined from effectuating those provisions.
Moreover, plaintiff asserts that the unconstitutionality
of the sections complained of so materially affect the scope
of the Money Management Act as to render all of its provisions so uncertain and meaningless as to render the Act
impossible of administration and therefore unconstitutional.
The Money Management Act, Chapter 206, Laws of
Utah, 1969, (Senate Bill #205) is unconstitutional in that
it seeks to deprive the State Treasurer of his powers and
duties as a constitutional officer and in particular of the
powers and duties granted to him under the provisions of
Article VII, Section 17, Constitution of the State of Utah.
Appellant submits that the judgment of the District
Court is erroneous and that this Court should reverse its
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decision. In its stead, it should find that the Money Manac;emcnt Act is unconstitutional and of no effect.
Respectfully submitted,
A.M.FERRO
Special Asst. Attorney General
414 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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